This formation was devised to counter my friend’s, which is similarly lopsided. This is the reason why the Left-winger is so high up the  pitch, but it also has an attacking advantage in general. The Right-midfielder may appear to be so far back as to not cause many attacks up that flank, but in-fact the interaction between the central midfielder and the right-midfielder is probably the most consistent in the system.

The principles are:

Defence

- The wing-backs provide cover wide, as do the attacking wide players who are instructed to come back and defend. The wing-backs push high up the pitch to help with the aggressive pressing, as well as to augment attacks.

- The staggering of the central defensive partnership means that a lot of pressure is placed on the sweeper, who is ideally an agile defender with good passing and tackling.

- The anchor-man ahead provides a dual role: Covering defence so as to create a rough back 3/5, but also to help provide a linking player between the defence and the higher zones. He’s also meant to cover the large distance in between the left wing-back and the winger, but a quick left-wing back will help (such as Udinese’s Pablo Armero).

Midfield

- The CAM’s role depends upon the player occupying it and their virtues. For example, I have deployed Arjen Robben in this role when playing as Bayern Munich, but I have also used Antonio Candreva there when playing as Udinese. The difference being that the former is essentially a winger or forward, and the latter is a more old fashioned kind of playmaker. They both, however, have a pivotal role ‘in the hole’.

- A lot of pressure is placed upon the central-midfielder. Not only do they shield the defence, they also provide an important role in the passing up the pitch.  In a possessive system like this, such a player is central as they do not have the attacking emphasis of the CAM, and must fulfill both duties. My favourite player so far in this position is Udinese’s Kwadwo Asamoah.

- The right-midfielder’s attacks from deep mean that it depends upon what kind of player is deployed there. I have deployed Xabi Alonso, as a deep-lying playmaker on the right here, but also Fabio Coentrao as a versatile (yet inverted as Coentrao is naturally left-footed) wing-back. I have also used my virtual pro here, who is a tall right-midfielder who cuts inside and shoots with his natural left foot.

Forwards

The forward line is very fluid here depending on where the ball advances up the pitch, but generally the more attacking players are the lone striker and the left-winger due to their starting position.  The consistent role, however, is the lone striker, perfect for versatile yet deadly players like Mario Gomez, Gonzalo Higuain and Antonio DiNatale. Much emphasis here is based on ‘defending from the front’: winning what interceptions and standing tackles as they can, and distributing it to a wide player or the playmaker behind. The layout of the system means that most goals scored come from quick passes in between individual players, leading to an attack on goal such as a chip or a finessed shot, usually into the right-hand corner of the net.

Summary

This formation is highly possessive, is good at defending in-depth against highly attacking formations, and benefits from quick or very hard working wide players. A lot of pressure is placed upon the sweeper, and the central midfielders, but players suited to those roles (e.g. Pepe, Sami Khedira, and Kwadwo Asamoah, looking longitudinally) make this a very sound system which is difficult to breakdown.

When at its most fluent in attack, this formation is devastatingly effective – I beat Napoli 4-0 as Udinese, and could have scored 8 if I’d taken all of my clear-cut chances. It also, however, can breakdown if the lone forward is not mobile enough or if the wide players are ineffective.

[Copyright-Free image courtesy of http://www.odt.org]

When managers, players and commentators call the English Premier League the ‘best in the world’, or even ‘greatest’ league, they do not make a simple statement. Such a contest seems only winnable by the Premier League when looking at viewing figures; this is not an argument I will get sucked into, except that I feel it speaks to something sinister behind the Premier League. The widespread belief in its supremacy over other domestic leagues should worry, as it arguably justifies an unjust situation which speaks to the very structure of modern, ‘global’ football.

Pele famously predicted that there would be an African winner of the FIFA World Cup by the end of the Twentieth Century. We know now that he was, simply, wrong; but what of the last winner of the 20^th Century, France? Their ‘rainbow team’ drew on talent from all over French society, especially from former French colonies – Zinedine Zidane from Algeria, for example. Indeed, the ‘rainbow team’ was a highly positive thing in France: this example of a cohesive, wonderful team drawing players from a range of backgrounds helped to contradict and challenge racist politicians such as Jean-Marie Le Pen – the leader of the far-right Fronte Nationale (or FN). It challenged not only the assumption that French society must be judged on its colour, it also speaks to the fact that a ‘footballing culture’ is to do with place, to do with geography and location. It seems a can of worms to argue that the rainbow team were, in-fact, African and not French – that isn’t something I will be drawn into, except that it is this relationship between being French and (for example) Algerian which is of interest.

The Premier League’s ‘supremacy’ very much rests on this – not only does it depend on monetary wealth, but the exploitation and importation of talent from abroad. Few teams in the EPL lack a star from a country formerly under colonial rule. These players are often among the most celebrated – Peter Odemwingie of Nigeria, for example, at West Bromwich Albion; Michael Essien of Ghana at Chelsea; Luis Suarez of Uruguay at Liverpool. All of these came through non-English leagues, cycling around the global domestic system before reaching the ‘promised land’ of the Premier League (something to mock and question, I feel).

What do I mean, then, by ‘Postcolonial’? Postcolonialism is a term used usually in the study of literature, but also of history and other subjects. There are problems with universalising the study and critique of the colonised and colonisers. A person who studies postcolonial India will know that it will differ from, say, Nigeria: it’s useful however to draw them both under the general field of ‘Postcolonialism’. To guard against a loss of specificity, which could lead us to ignoring elements by taking to wide a survey, is an important problem and concern which scholars have taken.

In summary, it is this relationship, where we study the ‘effects of colonization on the cultures of both the colonizers and the colonized’, which concerns ‘post’colonial studies [definition taken from Ian Buchanan, Oxford Dictionary of Critical Theory, Oxford University Press 2010]. The contention is often, that colonization may have officially ended with independence, but countries in Africa, South America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific still have a relationship with the ‘the West’ which is uncomfortably similar to imperialism and colonialism. We see popular political resistance to this in terms of struggles against ‘globalisation’, something which is producing reasons and situations to struggle against every day. It is this globalisation which perhaps concerns this discussion the most. If the reader does not have an understanding of what ‘globalisation’ is, I can only encourage in this space to research, as it’s something which will make you look back at your own society (whichever side you are on – ‘globalisers’ and ‘globalised’, as it were, to return to our central dialectic).

This relationship is evident in football, too: consider the fact that teams in the European Union are only able to sign a limited number from outside the EU every year, or the very concept of ‘home grown’ players, and the ways clubs attempt to effectively get around these restrictions. What is being created with these policies is a situation whereby one person is classed as one thing and the next person in another way: these policies categorise and control individuals, and help control the horizons of what it is to be a footballer outside of Europe’s free borders. Teams such as Arsenal rely on vast networks of clubs (‘feeder clubs’ as they’re often called, over which they suffered a scandal five years ago) in order to negotiate with these systems so that their players can gain work permits. Rather than such players developing in their own countries, the emphasis is on the extraction of these players as youths and their (eventual) importation into English football. We thus have situations such as the recent one where Emmanuel Frimpong, a defensive midfielder for Arsenal, had the choice of opting internationally for Ghana (where he was born) or England, where he has spent his life since he was 9. Even then, this process is controlled on a global level by the authority that is FIFA:

‘To complete his nationality transfer, Frimpong must await Fifa clearance – which is dependent on the world governing body receiving paperwork from the Football Associations of both Ghana and England.’ [See previous link] – There are obvious problems with the need for such a global authority to control and legitimise individuals’ careers.

This begs the question: would Frimpong have developed into the player he is today if he remained in Ghana? The answer matters for what it says of how Ghanaian football is forced to be effectively subservient to non-Ghanaian football. To play devil’s advocate, there is much to be said of players improving by developing away from their ‘home’ nation – take Owen Hargreaves as an English example, developing in Germany and being an arguably ‘different’ kind of player. Joe Cole has moved across the channel to LOSC Lille and is now flourishing. This geographical diversity can be strength, but it can also be a weakness. At the international level, the weekly togetherness of club football cannot be replicated. Unless players are at the same club, they will not be on the same team except when they line up for their country. This is why the ‘national team spirit’ is stressed, which depends on a national spirit existing – such as Brazil’s Samba football, South Africa’s Bafana Bafana, and England’s ‘hoof-it’ 4-4-2 (to be less serious). But we must ask an important question: would national footballing cultures such as that in Brazil (narrated brilliantly in Jonathan Wilson’s book Inverting The Pyramid, where he plots the tactical development of several other national games) have developed had most of its players been abroad as adults? This is a great worry for African national teams, who must battle this scattering of their personnel, but also the ‘inconvenience’ created by the sheer distance of having to travel across the globe.

Take the illustrative example of Youssouf Mulumbu, the Congolese midfielder, a highly talented and youthful central midfielder who plays for West Bromwich Albion. He is famed in his home country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo [this is an excellent article, by the by], who experienced the complex relationship which modern football has produced: he played for France at the youth level, but opted to play for the DR Congo national team. Despite the fact he did this partly to help heal the Congo, a country which has seen immense conflicts for some time, he has since retired from international football in order to protect his career. As a player who soaked up the footballing culture not only in France, growing up in an urban ‘banlieue’, but had his professional career begin in earnest following a move to English club West Bromwich Albion (he was the 2010-11 season player of the year), he is an excellent portrait of a modern African footballer, caught between the worlds of ‘unglamorous’ internationals and the immense popularity and fame of the Premier League. There is no way to know what the ‘discussions’ Mulumbu had with his family and advisers contained – but it seems highly odd that a player who can boast the fame equivalent to David Beckham would shy away from such fame. Indeed, should Mulumbu bother? He can be watched by hundreds of millions in Africa, who flock to watch English football, especially the ‘big four’. Whatever the case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has lost one of its most talented footballers. In the Postcolonial world of football, players such as Michael Essien can be nurtured and produced: but they can also be lost. But so long as the supremacy of the Premier League and other prestigious competitions is accepted and supported, we may have to wait some time for an African winner of world football’s highest accolade. Yet again, a situation where human resources – both in terms of fans as well as players – flow from the (post)colonial countries into Europe and America is in place.  This is deeply unsettling, hardly ever questioned, almost hidden and even necessary to support the marketing of the Premier League as the ‘best in the world’. Has imperialism and injustice really died, or has it now got a new, sporting face?

Part of ‘Deconstructing Football’

Saha - just one forward who Everton cannot rely on - Image via Wikipedia

Outside of the narrative of big spending in Manchester and the red side of Liverpool, one of the more compelling cases in the transfer market this summer has been Everton. They are a side who should ‘on paper’ be in decline, however they have had an excellent start to the season, picking up points from 3 out of their 4 Premier League fixtures – they are 2 points better this season than they were having played the same number of fixtures last season.

Everton have constricted finances due to debt and lack of external investment, and have not been able to spend a decent sum on a single player as they have in previous seasons (Fellaini being an example) – David Moyes has been highly restricted in a financial sense. However, they find themselves having started well, despite the fact the general narrative over the previous seasons has been that they have started poorly and picked up form to lift themselves into the top half, usually into contention for Europe. Whether this trend is simply reversed this season is yet to be decided, but it’s interesting to study in the light of the fact that Everton have a distinct lack of forwards in their squad.

Louis Saha is often injured, and has not had any impact this season. Jermaine Beckford has been sold to raise much needed cash, and Yakubu has not been at the club now since January, having joined Blackburn permanently after a loan at Leicester; they have also sold prized playmaker Mikel Arteta to Arsenal, who is still in-fact their leading goal scorer (indicative of their lack of forwards); meanwhile James Vaughan has left for Norwich after a loan at Crystal Palace. It makes sense, then, that David Moyes must continue with his enforced strategy of finding goals around the pitch, and even extend it.

Firstly, let’s look at these chalkboards which compare the passes in Everton’s opening game (where they had players such as Arteta and Beckford as options) and their most recent where they have their ‘reduced’ pool of talent.  In the chalkboard you can see that the passing is now less saturated in the central zones of the pitch (where Arteta played), which is illustrated by looking at Arteta’s passes in that game.

Furthermore, they were more successful in completing passes into the box, which suggests (apart from the score) a more competent attacking performance.

If we look also at their goal scorers in Table 1 (see below), it’s clear that the majority of their goals have been due to players other than forwards attacking the goal. The spread of their goals among so many players is suggestive that the argument I am outlining here is convincing, that they are not reliant on a single goal scorer.

This is in contrast with Liverpool, who have scored the same amount of goals (in more games) and have spent their funds since January on expanding their attacking departments. Let’s compare the top scorers of the 3 teams below Everton:

As you can see here, QPR are in a similar boat to Everton and have found goals from around the pitch, although not in the same fashion as Everton, all their scorers being  players who will conventionally attack the box in their system.  Wolves and Liverpool have been reliant on forwards as well. Everton’s most recent game shows this trend too, where Fellaini and Neville both scored fine efforts to knock West Brom out of the Carling Cup.

Let’s summarise by pointing out that this is still extremely early in the season, but Everton have got the best goal difference out of the block analysed, and this is not because of a lack of attacking or a focus on defending, they have scored 2 more than they have conceded:

“I’ve saw it on the tape numerous times and – we’ll see.” – Paul Lambert, Norwich manager

Both teams surely felt they had to win, and could do, having had a slow start to the season. Norwich wanted to record their first win, having drawn twice already – Albion had been handed a difficult start to the fixture list and had conceded late in all their August fixtures leading to three losses in a row. Roy Hodgson denied this was evidence of a trend prior to the match.

General shapes - note emphasis on Tierney's arrow

A sombre start to proceedings could be expected, considering that firstly the stadium observed applause for Albion’s academy player Blake Melbourne, who has passed away after illness. Then, a commemorative silence followed for the September 11^th 2001 attacks.

However, despite Hodgson’s lack of acknowledgment of trends, another continued: Albion scored early, breaking the sombre atmosphere. Steven Reid had within the first minute played an early cross into the box – this was a theme throughout the match, and it was a similar ball by Nicky Shorey which activated a clever piece of combination play between Albion’s forwards. Shane Long shepherded former Albion centre-back Leon Barnett away, whilst Peter Odemwingie exploited the space and lack of guile between Ritchie De Laet and Tierney. Thus, within 2 minutes Albion had an advantage to which they held onto throughout the match – a similar tale to previous fixtures, but this time a success.

Wide involvement

Other than prior to Albion’s goal, this trend of early crosses – or the involvement of full backs in general – was very much a feature of Norwich’s strategy. This was usually fulfilled by left-back Tierney, who ventured forward on many occasions. Left-midfielder Richard Surman played slightly inside, leaving a channel open for Tierney. Because both sides matched each other in very similar 4-4-2 shapes, Albion were not able to counter Norwich decisively when they packed this zone – indeed, Dorrans often drifted inside too and went ‘missing’ for periods of the game. This is mainly because Dorrans was clearly instructed to use his passing ability from deep, rather than act as a winger and beat his opponents. Dorrans was best used when he sliced Norwich open with pinpoint through-balls along the ground, exploiting the opposing team’s static shape. This created several opportunities which were not capitalised upon.

Here we can see a diagram of the strategy involving Tierney. Passes to the left-back were usually from Lee Crofts, Surman, or Hoolahan (who replaced Surman). This essentially drew Albion’s players away from Tierney’s zone, until he played a cross, not choosing to beat Steven Reid. Meanwhile, the central players and the forwards attacked the box, with left-midfielder Bennett approaching the edge of the area to either attack the ball or recycle the play. Albion’s left-sided centre-back Jonas Olsson was often drawn forwards to stop play; it made sense to exploit the rather open wide channels. It’s fair to say that Albion were narrower than Norwich in their approach, with Dorrans’ strategy already covered, Jerome Thomas did not adapt his usual game of cutting inside onto his right-foot, which resulted in some efforts on goal. A running theme was that Bennett or Naughton (usually the former) would foul Thomas lightly in order to disrupt the play on that side. Graeme Dorrans also received some heavy challenges, and it was most definitely a physical contest.

Matching formations

The tactical side mainly concerned the fact that the two formations were, essentially, the same. In defence Norwich dropped back, but when they possessed the ball they ranged further up the pitch and looked reasonably effective. This suited their formation, bringing the bands closer together. Norwich were however simply inaccurate, and were unlucky that the Tierney strategy did not pay-off. So much so that Paul Lambert chose in the midst of the second half to swap his strike partnership, with James Vaughan and Steve Morison replacing Martin and Holt. This pacier partnership benefitted from Hoolahan’s forward thinking, with the front pair combining with one of the midfielders in triangles in an attempt to pass around Albion’s matching lines. Generally Olsson played excellently, and although he was cautioned he had much to do and many of the challenges were perfectly fair – Gabriel Tamas, his partner at the back, looked suspect defensively and (importantly) mentally. Some poor clearances handed Norwich chances on goal, and he was turned and bypassed on one occasion, forcing Ben Foster to make a save.

On the above diagram I have indicated some important zones where the game generally hinged – firstly, Odemwingie and Long repeatedly tested the weak partnership of Barnett and De Laet. Barnett was always suspect in his days at Albion, and De Laet is a young player on loan from Manchester United. A goal, as well as a number of fouls resulted from this area. Secondly, I have already flagged up the physical battle between Jerome Thomas and Bennett. This tied up this side of the pitch, and effectively silenced and occupied (arguably) both teams’ best wide players. Bennett broke free on a number of occasions, though, as did Thomas. Thirdly, we have the battle between Olsson and Holt, which helped to decide the fact that Norwich’s narrative was one of wasted efforts rather than successful pressure. An extra player would have helped decide this, and Hoolahan’s introduction was late – a formation change would have been prudent by Paul Lambert in order to exploit the fact Albion were very much reliant on the Swede. Fourthly, Steven Reid’s zone was occupied by both Tierney and Surman, which did not allow Reid to come forward on many occasions. Paul Scharner also remained quiet on the attack on this side, although this is not a bad thing.

It is somewhat indicative that the main events occurred in these areas of the pitch, with it being generally end-to-end. Albion’s passing and ball retention was never good in this match, which Hodgson acknowledged in his post-match interviews. It is always difficult, however, to keep the ball when you have an opposing player tacked onto you, with both shapes being so similar.

Albion hung on however because Norwich were not clinical, and did not take the chances presented to them. This is also true of the away side: Albion missed a penalty (see below), had an effort by Dorrans power into the post, and Mulumbu fired wide having ridden the challenges of the Norwich defenders.

Referee decisions

The referee generally did not intervene throughout the match – Bennett could have been more strictly lectured for his contest with Jerome Thomas, for example. However, there were some immensely contentious decisions which I will cover here quickly:

1. Albion’s penalty. Steven Reid was fouled in the box, even if it was lightly – this was a 50/50 decision. However, players such as De Laet had been heavily challenging Albion’s attackers previously, and this perhaps influenced the referee’s decision. Odemwingie attempted a Rooney-esque power penalty into the corner, but latched onto it with none of the power and not in the corner – youthful keeper Declan Rudd (who had an impetuous fluctuating game throughout) was able to save it at full stretch, having anticipated this technique from his approach.
2. Tamas and Reid both shove players: the first was probably fair, and the second was a rash and cynical challenge brought about because of Norwich flooding forward in a swift counter-attack. A free kick was awarded but there was a real lack of steel in this phase of play, with Norwich bypassing much of Albion’s ball winning department.
3. Tamas’ elbow. Since, Tamas has been charged by the FA for violent conduct. Vaughan had to receive plastic surgery following the game at hospital, and was definitely elbowed in the face. It’s my opinion that this was deliberate, and was in response to a foul on Tamas which had occurred previously, as well as a frustration with Norwich’s players attempting to claim penalties throughout the match (i.e. drawing Albion’s defenders into fouls). However, Tamas was clearly the aggressor here and should have been red carded – the resulting penalty could have easily changed the complexion of the result. Tamas is an odd player, being known for making rash or silly decisions but being a generally decent centre-back: when play breaks down however, or when he is forced to make a decision he often makes poor ones, such as Ryan Shotton’s goal against Stoke. It’s my opinion that he should be dropped in favour of a more intelligent player in his position.

‘We’ll see’

This match was, overall, an odd one. There is not much to say tactically, beyond the Tierney strategy and Dorrans’ role in distributing to the new front partnership. This is one symptom of why it was an ultimately unconvincing performance by Albion. Some fans have said it was good to ‘win ugly’. I’m pleased with the fact we were able to grab an early goal once again, and have reversed the trend from last season where we’d concede and fight back to win. However, with Tamas’ elbow it could easily have been another late goal conceded, and this is worrying no matter what Hodgson says. Almost every game Albion have played now they’ve matched a team in terms of shape, excepting Chelsea who looked flat when they were being dominated (a clue as to why their formation was not much help until they started using it to their advantage).  Following the game, Paul Lambert’s statement on Tamas’ actions has stuck in my mind, the phrase: “We’ll see”. Lambert is known for not mincing words, or saying things in as simple a way as possible. He often repeats the same praises for his players, and is not the most charismatic man to interview, unlike the ‘amiable’ Roy Hodgson. However, he got this word play exactly right. It was clear to Lambert that the FA would view the video evidence and charge Tamas for his foul play, and perhaps this would take some of the pressure off his side’s growing reputation for giving away penalties (all 4 of their Premier League fixtures have featured a penalty being conceded). In a wider sense, however, I must ask whether “we’ll see” if this is a real turning point in Albion’s season, or part of a trend of having to win the difficult way: the counter-part of losing due to key decisions. After all, I too have seen this on tape numerous times. We’ll see.

‘To get so close and once again concede a late goal…one is tempted to feel that one has been harshly treated in the last couple of games’ – Roy Hodgson, 20/08/2011, after Chelsea 2-1 West Bromwich Albion

Albion's first half shape

This is an easy game to analyse for all the wrong reasons, with the added spin of a derby day. Both teams filed their usual systems for this game, with two relatively static 4-4-1-1 shapes facing one another. In both, however, the attacker behind the advanced forward drifted around the pitch and was the locus for most attacks: Somen Tchoyi for Albion and Jonathan Walters for Stoke. The Potters played their expected long-ball approach which has become their trademark in the Premier League.

The one significant change for Albion was that, in the first half, they ditched the notion of inverting their wide midfielders, something they had pursued in the late losses to Manchester United and Chelsea. This pointed to a contest in which Albion wanted to use their pace and crossing in the wider zones, against the slow but strong full-backs of Stoke. A statistic says that in the 2010/11 season Stoke had one of the worst defences for conceding headed goals: slow full-backs generally encourage wingers to have fun, negating the strategy of packing players with height in the box. Indeed, Huth is primarily a centre-back and started at right-back, whilst Wilson (replaced by Wilkinson due to a hamstring injury near the end of the first half) is of a similar mould.

In the first half Albion’s shape was, overall, the more successful – Tchoyi drifted with the play well, and it was only the display of smart reflexes by Begovic which kept out Shane Long’s point-blank header resulting from Tchoyi’s cross to the near-post. Paul Scharner threatened not far off the right-hand post too, as did Olsson at the opposite end of the woodwork. Other efforts were confined to volleys and half volleys outside the box. None were successful and required a player of higher calibre in this area.

It was clear, however, that the two shapes were effectively stalemating each other. Whilst Albion passed the ball around with increasingly varied length, Stoke almost exclusively played long balls over the top. This had the bonus for Albion of causing them to regain possession often, but they usually squandered it. At the end of the match, Albion had 12 shots off target and 4 on.

Once again Mulumbu was the definite anchor man with Paul Scharner being given license to come forward when he saw fit. Had Tchoyi passed and not fired a shot in the second half, perhaps Scharner would have scored in space. Scharner, however, is not an attacking midfielder and it is a rather wasteful game plan to not cater to your players’ strengths (Scharner’s goal scoring being from corners or from the edge of the area, stereotypical for his role as a ball-winner). This is one source of frustration I have had watching the opening three games and it is down to the change in system. Shane Long, meanwhile, did not save Albion’s graces with his poaching ability. What I’m saying, is this performance seemed to be coming.

A positive for Albion was the way they operated down their left-hand flank. Brunt was encouraged to play his accurate crosses because he was on his natural left-foot. Nicky Shorey was encouraged to come forward, overlapping, and played some pinpoint crosses. This forward focus did not matter much as Jermaine Pennant had a quiet game, and Robert Huth was out of his depth against the pace and guile of Tchoyi, Brunt and Shorey who all crowded his zone. As the half wore on, Albion switched the play more and more to the right, with Tchoyi drifting that way. This took pressure off of Mulumbu and Olsson, Albion’s defensive players on the centre-left. They were arguably Albion’s best players by some distance. This meant that Matthew Etherington came into the game more, and both Pennant and Whelan were unlucky at the close of the half.

Stoke’s shape mirrored Albion in midfield, with Dean Whitehead keeping back in the defensive zones and Whelan coming forward when he felt able. Neither did much though beyond playing the ball forward to Walters, which was the reason why Mulumbu was under a lot of pressure throughout the match. Kenwynne Jones, meanwhile, was poor on the ball and often dallied. This led to an easy game for Tamas in the centre-right zone.

What is unpalatable about Stoke’s ‘old fashioned’ strategy in many ways is that it seems back-to-front: they play it very quickly out of the back four with direct passing, but were rather slow in the attacking zones. This is rather contrary to the logic of playing the ball out slowly and advancing up the pitch, picking up speed as the play flows forwards. This, however, played into Albion’s hands – they were never outnumbered, and usually had men spare to cover channels. This was a symptom as much of their caution as their organisation, though.

Tchoyi was usually Albion’s most profitable avenue for a goal, but he made a lot of poor decisions. I will not put this down as being a purely bad performance, and leave the point that he had very little support and (again) was expected to be a rather isolated playmaker. Albion were rather wide, when perhaps they should have been bolder and narrower – this would have allowed Reid as well as Shorey space to come forward and get involved. Morrison and Brunt, however, were not inverted.

Second half: ‘change places!’

Double ended arrow indicates delivery; other arrows denote general movement around the pitch as usual

Half-time brought several tactical changes to the match, with odd effect. Brunt and Morrison swapped sides, with Tony Pulis responding in an unsophisticated but logical way by inverting his own full-backs. We thus had the spectacle of watching the same players on the exact same side of the pitch in both halves. One could be forgiven for thinking they did not even swap ends. This produced a sort of ‘mirroring’ effect.

Stoke, meanwhile, grasped the fact they needed to play narrower. With Pennant and Etherington being rarely involved except to play passes into Walters, it made sense for them to drift towards the centre and assist in picking up possession, breaking up play. This blunted Scharner’s forward runs, who kept back for most of the second half. The result was a less stretched Stoke defence, which found it rather easy to deal with Tchoyi and Long in the centre, who were a largely predictable partnership by the second period. Whitehead and Whelan meanwhile drew closer together and played better as a result.

Despite both teams being rather focussed in the wider areas of the pitch, the first corner of the game came in the 51^st minute. None of the rest were inspiring, either. The errors piled up as the blunt shapes continued to pound at one another with little aesthetic beauty – the sight of Wilkinson playing a long-ball towards the centre, ‘over the top’, was a common one. Tactics like this sometimes beggar rationality as they rely as much on chance and aggression as precision.

The important changes of the second half came in the final half hour, with a series of substitutions on both sides, changing the game steadily. For Albion, Jerome Thomas replaced Chris Brunt and took up his place on the left, with Morrison moving back to his natural right side. This meant a contrast of two wingers’ styles, with the traditional wing play of Morrison (not much in evidence) set against the cutting inside and possession-based threat of Thomas. Thomas was not involved much beyond some decent play, made an error which he cleaned up and looked solid defensively; back from a medium-term injury it’s hard to have asked for more. Marc-Antoine Fortuné then replaced Tchoyi, taking up the advanced role with Long playing behind off him. This made some sense because Fortuné is more of an assist-giver or link man than a goal scoring forward. A more progressive choice would have been Simon Cox, who is the superior finisher, which is what Albion lacked (12 shots off target, again). He didn’t have much time to make an impact. Graeme Dorrans was the final replacement, coming on for Morrison, which was met with applause from the fans for many reasons. Albion still seemed like a second class side.

Stoke were not much better, but their replacements made a lot of sense: Tony Pulis appeared to be happy with a point following a European game in the week, and they could always nick a winner like they did the week before, while Albion seemed happy to keep pounding the same tactical drum. Danny Pugh replaced Matthew Etherington with Ryan Shotton coming on for Jermaine Pennant. Both are primarily defensive players and could easily have been their full-backs on paper. This increased Stoke’s security, and encouraged their narrower shape – rather than trying to outpace the Albion wide players they channelled their talents inwards towards the centre, being difficult to knock off the ball.

Including the swap of Wilkinson in the first half, all three of Stoke’s substitutions were defensive ones. Albion’s meanwhile were all of an offensive nature, but they were far too late to have any real impact and did not solve their problems. The psychological straitjacket of settling into a long-ball, ‘hoof’ game was done and Albion seemed to have lost much of their natural attacking instinct. This wasn’t the ball-playing Albion side of last year: the mix this season seems to be more ‘traditional’, ‘over the top’, and it is not working. With players such as Thomas returning, however, we may see some changes.

Controversial late goal

Reading the rest of the narrative it is difficult to imagine Stoke scoring: it was a ‘bore draw’ in all but result. However, the narrow and aggressive tactics of Stoke produced a late goal. Tamas, not having had much to do against an ineffective Jones all game was presented with the choice of covering the ball and allowing Foster to claim it or to attack the ball and clear it. He chose the former and the resulting mix-up led to Shotton scoring into an open net. The controversy comes from whether Shotton was showing his studs in the air, threatening the health of Foster, who was attempting to catch the ball (in a ‘flappy’ way it must be said).

The controversy for me, however, was that either team deserved to take anything from this turgid contest. Both managers should frankly be ashamed with the negative tactics on display, which was not dissimilar from pub football teams at times. Not every team can play like Barcelona, and it is not always desirable to see that. A physical, hardworking, direct game can be thrilling if done well: Germany at the 2010 World Cup can be presented as great examples of this, combining good play with the ball on the deck as well as supreme, precise counter attacking. We’ve seen Arsenal last season, and Inter in the 09/10 season slay Barcelona with such style, and that is in itself thrilling. Owen Hargreaves, who Albion hope to secure on a pay-as-you-play deal, gave one of the greatest and most thrilling performances I have ever seen when he ran with immense industry and stamina against Portugal in the 2006 World Cup. This, however, was not much more than people shouting ‘hoof it!’

This change in mentality, as much as shape, is the problem for Albion and they have to change this if this trend of late goals deciding tight contests is to end. Poached efforts are simply not enough, concerted pressure is better, which was the mantra last season under Hodgson as well as Roberto Di Matteo. ‘One is tempted to feel’ that this is the crux of the problem: late goals should not result from a firmly ‘structuralist’ approach. Meanwhile, the Stoke fans sang ‘We always beat West Brom’: awful.

Bibliography:

Stats: http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/match/2011/aug/28/westbrom-v-stokecity

Staying up - as good as any cup final. Image via Wikipedia

West Brom have, over the years, been castigated as a ‘yo-yo club’ by many. However, this is a largely irrational argument which ignores the circumstances and evidence – and it is this argument which vindicates the club. It is, however, not alone and should extend its approach. Let’s look, importantly, at the evidence.

Earlier this week in anticipation with the up-coming contest, Albion’s Jonas Olsson acted as the players’ (and clubs’) voice in the press. The left-footed centre-back said that Stoke City, their rivals up in North Staffordshire, are inspirational for Albion and are a package they should attempt to emulate.

This is an essentially comparative way at looking at the two clubs’ recent fortunes, and it’s one I favour. It is far away from my personal distaste over lazy comparisons which rest on the shadiest of factors. Examples of such journalistic sloth include the endless parade over Villas-Boas’ appointment (did you know that he is young, handsome, Portuguese, managed Porto and won the Europa League/Uefa Cup and now is managing Chelsea?! Did I mention José Mourinho did the same things?); or perhaps whenever a player is hailed as the ‘new’ incarnation of a past legend. These comparisons are usually trite because they simply don’t hold up to evidence at all beyond conjecture.

So I’m going to compare Albion to Udinese Calcio, defeated by Arsenal in the Champions League qualifiers this week. Both wear stripes, and occupy or aspire to mid-table security. Ok, beyond the vague comparisons, there is something to this, and it importantly allows us to analyse Albion’s strategy first and foremost. Udinese are one of the stranger clubs you will read about – they punch far above their weight, but they are proof that prudent planning in terms of the acquisition of players can keep a superficially ‘inferior’ club in the top echelons, and even achieve European qualification on a number of occasions. That Udinese have had 16 seasons of consecutive top-flight football as well could be a more comforting record to emulate rather than Stoke City’s three (come May, four, if Stoke do not follow the trend encapsulated by teams like Charlton Athletic of well-structured regional clubs eventually failing in the Premier League).

What is Albion’s strategy then?

If we look at Albion’s recent strategy since their rise to the Premier League during Gary Megson’s tenure as manager, we can summarily describe it as ‘building slowly but surely’. Albion’s financial strategy has been analysed superbly by the Swiss Ramble, who among other things said in summary:

This ‘building’ is, in reality, an off-the-pitch endeavour as much as it is building a squad. There are radical differences between the current playing staff and the roster of only a few seasons ago – some of these departures, such as Neil Clement and Dean Kiely were due to retirement. Most departures, however, have been player sales following relegations. We can observe the high-fee sales of the likes of (then-captain) Curtis Davies to Aston Villa, the brief but profitable stay of Paul McShane who was sold to oft-spending Sunderland. Other sales include Jonathan Greening and Zoltan Gera, both to Fulham, and the controversial left-back Paul Robinson to Bolton Wanderers. There have also been some less successful acquisitions, such as the purchase of Luke More from Aston Villa, who was a very poor purchase considering Albion were able to observe him on loan before making the switch permanent, and as well the only recent departure of centre-back Abdoulaye Meite who spent much of his Albion career in the reserves or looking to restart his career at the club. And then there are the more balanced arrivals and sales, the players who served the club respectably and left for a similar fee to the one they arrive on – Scott Carson and Borja Valero have both departed this summer permanently, although fans will have mixed reactions to their record. So whilst the club has profited greatly from player sales, it has not spent greatly either, usually spending larger fees (relative to Albion’s idea of large fees) on bigger acquisitions such as Carson and Valero.

Importantly we must refer back to the Swiss Ramble:

So whilst the stays in the Premier League have not resulted in an immediate, total revamping of the playing squad there has been a steady upgrading of the club’s infrastructure, which is something I have praised in the past as a strategy, and seen a lack of such a framework as a sign of impending relegation.

The off-the-pitch improvements, organisational in nature, have however been in concert with the transfer policy of the club. We come now to the role of the enigmatic Dan Ashworth, a name which does not light up memories outside of Albion’s bubble. He was originally brought in to manage the club’s new youth Academy, and has since gone on to be the partner of Albion’s head coach. It has been said in the past that Albion have a ‘continental model’ which shuns the doctrine of an all-powerful manager, and instead holds dear a prominent board (Jeremy Peace, the chairman and essential owner of Albion, is a vocal ambassador for the club – compare this perhaps to the owners of Manchester United who are seldom seen in the media), and a link between them and their Coach. This is the notorious ‘director of football’ debate which has plagued English football for many years now. What is clear is that you cannot have an all-powerful manager and an all-powerful director of football competing with one another within the club’s power structure. It was this which tore apart Newcastle United and West Ham’s set-ups. Dan Ashworth, however, is more akin to a chief scout than a corporate figure or ‘ambassador’ for the board.

The fruits of Ashworth and the rest of the set-up is rather clear when one examines Albion’s transfer policy. Which is, to acquire players with good “pedigree” as ex-manager Tony Mowbray oft-said when describing a new acquisition of low profile, which includes successes like young playmaker Graeme Dorrans, and failures such as Bartosz Slusarski (don’t ask me what position he operates in). More recently, Canadian forward Marcus Haber was plucked from North America, but did not impress enough to break into the first team. Rather than this being a failure, it’s positive to look at these as learning experiences, or the inevitable lack of success one sometimes meets in life.

Dorrans was the fans’ player of the season in the 09/10 campaign, and I recall the article in my minds’ eye on BBC announcing his signing, because of his youthful gurn in the image, but also by the fact he was plucked from – of all places – Livingston. His fee of £200,000 was an immense bargain, even if Albion had accepted the derisory offers from West Ham United last summer, but he could become a mainstay cog in Albion’s midfield for a decade or more. If that is the case, a mere £200k initial investment is an astonishing piece of business.

Another example of this kind of low-fee success is the 10/11 campaign’s player of the year, ball winning midfielder Youssouf Mulumbu who was signed for an amazingly low fee of £175k from Paris Saint-Germain. The fact that PSG are now fabulously wealthy from their oil-rich Qatari owners is an amusing contrast, as Mulumbu excelled in a league which is arguably far more competitive than Ligue 1. The fact the acquisition was after an eye-catching loan deal during a fateful year of relegation shows the strength of Albion’s approach to push on and make do with the position handed to them after whatever season.

I will not belabour this point, but all of this was because Albion’s approach has been, summarily, to use their scouting network to maximum advantage, and to buy youth players either on the cusp of major moves (Dorrans could easily have gone to an Old Firm club) or from the deadlock of certain teams’ restrictive set-up (Mulumbu has rapidly improved upon his record since PSG), in ‘second tier’ league structures such as Scotland, France and in eastern Europe. Then we have the talismanic signing of forward Peter Odemwingie last summer, whose fifteen-goal haul guaranteed Albion staying in the Premier League and reaching the mental security of 11^th place. Cameroonian Winger-cum-forward Somen Tchoyi looks to be a key player in his second season, having been the Austrian Player of the Year whilst at Rapid. Another feature has been the medical rehabilitation of injury troubled players, such as ex-Derby prospect Giles Barnes (who has since departed being restricted in a burgeoning winger department), ex-Millwall utility man Steven Reid and ex-Charlton and Arsenal prospect Jerome Thomas, all of whom contributed to Albion’s arguably best squad in nigh-on 30 years. There are other prospects I simply cannot go into for want of space and sanity.

In conclusion then we can see that Albion’s strategy is punctuated by:

-       Off-the-pitch and organisational expansion

-       Financial prudence

-       The exploitation of less watched leagues to sign eye-catching and low fee players, most with international experience

-       The reliance and Dan Ashworth and other key staff to be the spine of the club even as playing and managerial staff depart and arrive: the departure of Roberto DiMatteo and the rapid success and ‘gel-ing’ of Roy Hodgson.

-       A steady upward progression which has not lured the club into financial hedonism

All of this recognises the problems which Albion have, such as close neighbours who divide areas of supporters, and a local and domestic body of shareholders (contrast this to all of Albion’s local rivals who all have some kind of big-money benefactor providing some security). It also takes advantage of Albion’s respectable history as a club, being one of the founders of the Football League, having a proud and independent tradition.

Comparison with Udinese

Don’t worry if you forgot this was a comparative article. Udinese’s strategy is much the same, which can be garnered by reading even the briefest of articles on the Bianconeri. The difference, however, between Albion and Udinese is that Udinese are fully committed to the scouting approach that Albion only partially commit to. Whilst Albion clearly focus on Eastern Europe and Scotland (even ex-manager Tony Mowbray was plucked from Hibernian), Udinese have found their rich vein of prospects in Africa, South America and central Europe. Alexis Sánchez, who was sold for an eye-watering ‘ 26 million Euros with added variables of 11.5 million’ (whatever that means) was purchased for a mere €2 million as a 16-year old. His development was helped by the fact he had loan spells at South American clubs such as Chilean giant Colo Colo (from whom Albion purchased utility player Gonzalo Jara), and Argentinean titan River Plate.  This mirrors the approach of Albion, who last summer purchased Rochdale’s prospect Craig Dawson and immediately loaned him back to the League 1 club. He is now part of Ashworth’s ‘development squad’, and after impressing in the Carling Cup has been called up for the England under-21 squad.

Udinese have ‘sold their way’ to the top as much as they have scouted their way up there. Their success has only increased as years have gone by. This illustrates the efficacy of its strategy, and strategies of its like. The exorbitant fees for their products at Friuli, of which Sanchez is only the most memorable, has helped to finance the continuation of their policy, with reportedly 50 scouts worldwide netting talent – and it’s interesting and heartening in an era of spectacular fees, and summer spending sprees running up to 9 figure sums at the likes of Manchester City, PSG and Malaga that a club can consistently produce football talent and at reasonable and fair prices and salaries. Much of the criticism of Arsenal, for example, rests upon the latent assumption that their approach is cheap, temporary and usually unrewarding. Arsenal are a variation on the theme, with a much larger budget than Udinese. West Brom under Tony Mowbray were often compared to Arsenal too, and it is this comparison, of which I will speak of last is perhaps the most telling for the future.

Conclusion

Dan Ashworth, the brains behind the scenes at Albion, was brought in to manage the Academy. And it is the Academy which is perhaps the most exciting prospect. I have attempted to add clues to this being the crux upon which my analysis lasts, with the tests of players like Dorrans and Mulumbu culminating in Ashworth’s new ‘development squad’ attacking the challenge of the reserves. Whilst such an innovation may seem trivial, on an ideological level it is immensely important and indicative. With the Premier Leagues’ compulsory, maximum 25-man squad (over the age of 21 that is) the shift is logically turning towards youth talent. Why spend millions on a player to sit on the bench when one can acquire a player such as Craig Dawson or a more experienced player, such as Billy Jones or Gareth McAuley, for free or a reasonable fee?

And whilst West Bromwich Albion continue with this approach, keeping their record purchase at far below many of their rivals, and then later selling for larger fees (even for so-called ‘flops’ like Valero) then Albion will remain Udinese-esque, approaching the governance of its own domain within footballing culture in a rational fashion, keeping in mind the fact fans can easily push outside of their minds, that there is always somebody who has to get relegated and that there is the club at the heart of it all.

Bibliography:

http://swissramble.blogspot.com/2011/07/west-bromwich-albions-risk-averse.html

http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/may/16/west-bromwich-albion-everton-premier-league

http://www.footballeconomy.com/content/west-bromwich-albion-football-club-ltd

http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/chris-mcgrath-super-sanchez-is-the-latest-big-success-story-of-little-udineses-scouting-system-2297131.html

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/gabriele_marcotti/02/03/udinese.2/index.html

http://www.mirrorfootball.co.uk/opinion/columnists/james-nursey/James-Nursey-column-Revealed-Why-Dan-Ashworth-it-the-mystery-man-masterminding-West-Broms-stunning-Premier-League-success-article609153.html

Summary

Both teams showed spells of excellence in a tight contest. Chelsea had to make a tactical u-turn on 30 minutes, having gone a goal down and looking unlikely to solve the puzzle: Florent Malouda replaced Solomon Kalou. Before half-time the narrative of Chelsea constantly testing Albion in the box began, which persisted throughout the second half.

Approaches

Albion played with a mostly defensive 4-4-1-1, not too dissimilar to the system used last week. Shane Long’s goal was a combination of complacency by Chelsea and tactical awareness by the forward, who stole the ball as the Premier League runners-up lumbered around at the back. Despite being very close to one another, suiting short passing, Alex made a fundamental error and was not able to bully Long off the ball who then beat Hilario. Long looks like an excellent signing for Albion, strengthening one of the squad’s weaker areas: Albion now possess four good forwards (Long, Simon Cox, Peter Odemwingie and Somen Tchoyi).

Albion’s system last season put a lot of pressure on the wider players to perform. This was good news for players such as Jerome Thomas and Chris Brunt, who had good seasons, with Brunt being named captain. Whereas in a 4-2-3-1 the wider players have much more attacking responsibility, Albion’s system depended on Brunt and Morrison being very aware defensively, their attacking involvement usually being the playing of a through-ball. The fact that they were inverted points to the fact that Hodgson expected them to make tackles on players who cut inside, which was true of Chelsea’s tactics.

Chelsea meanwhile played a rather flat and narrow 4-3-3, which later arguably became a 4-3-2-1, with Anelka and Malouda as definite forwards and Cole and Bosingwa providing the threat in the wide zones. What ensued then was a rather stereotypical battle between 4-3-3 and 4-4-1-1 with both teams being outnumbered in some area.

In the early periods Albion was the superior side – their system flowed better, with Chelsea looking unimaginative. Albion were happy to facilitate this, their defensive strategy being to invite Chelsea into the centre of the pitch which Albion packed, standing off with the odd player closing down the player on the ball. The battle could not take place in the central midfield, as Albion’s two were outnumbered by the compact trio in Chelsea’s system (which honestly was a mistake by Hodgson in many respects). The Chelsea forwards, especially Kalou, took this bait as it is their usual strategy to play onto their stronger foot and take a shot or play a short ball. This was a risky strategy against the competent Chelsea forwards, but it succeeded in frustrating them. Malouda looked more effective than Kalou, and was a more physical and aerial threat against the firmly defensive full-back Steven Reid.

However, despite this being a decent strategy, it invited Chelsea onto Albion, as the former champions grew in confidence. Chelsea felt able to throw more players forwards, and often Chelsea were left with a back 3 of Terry, Alex and the anchor man Mikel. In-fact, it was this set-up which Long exploited for his goal. Whereas Chelsea did not involve their full-backs effectively in the earlier periods, this theme changed, a symptom of which was a fierce shot by Ashley Cole, saved well by Ben Foster. Somen Tchoyi and Shane Long proved a worthy occupation for the back three on the counter-attack. Lampard was happy to receive a yellow card in the 34^th minute, having fouled Long in the midst of a counter-attack. The most prominent example, however, of this was a poorly worked centering of the ball by Long in the box, with Tchoyi not accelerating onto the ball for the tap-in. Whether the 0-2 score line would have finished off the home side is impossible to determine, but it was a chance Albion had to take with their cautious approach.

http://www.guardianchalkboards.com/guardianchalkboards_embed.swf?chalkBoardID=81so7TuZ609y646Lojuj
 by Guardian Chalkboard

As you can see here, Albion had to intercept a lot on their left-hand side 

Chelsea repeatedly attacked down their right flank, threatening Albion’s left. WhoScored.com records that Bosingwa, the Chelsea right-back had 121 touches of the ball, compared to his opposite full-back Cole who touched the ball 88 times. Morrison often dropped into the space between left-back Shorey and the central midfielder (which was sometimes Mulumbu, sometimes Scharner). This, importantly, did not provide much space for Ramires to play: the pressure was on Chelsea’s full-backs to widen play, and this was the main change in Chelsea’s system. Albion packed the centre of the field, but covered the byline, which forced Chelsea inside. When Jose Bosingwa knocked the ball in the space between Morrison and Shorey, the Albion pairing were clearly tired and did not cover the byline as Steven Reid had done a number of times on the right-hand flank. This was the space which allowed Bosingwa to cross in with a pacy ball, finding Malouda on the right-hand post for the decisive goal.

Prior to this, Chelsea’s most promising avenue for victory was by playing short passes into the box, and packing it with their forward troika. Fernando Torres had a number of opportunities in this area. Anelka had the most promise however, who repeatedly cut inside on the right, trying to exploit the channel between Shorey and Olsson. He had by far the most touches of all the Chelsea forwards statistically, and this was borne out in the result with Anelka remaining unchallenged in the box, finding a space and finishing at an acute angle for the equalizer in the 52^nd minute.

Substitutions?

In terms of the contest between the managers, what was in evidence here was that Villas Boas made better use of his replacements. Ivanovic was a good shout to replace Alex, who looked wobbly and had made the goal-conceding error. Ivanovic played a precise ball over-the-top to Drogba, showing his attacking skill – had the game wore on longer I’d have expected Ivanovic to be involved in more goal scoring opportunities. This change put some pressure on John Terry, whose aggression grew as the match went on, and was lucky to escape a dismissal for grabbing Odemwingie, who had replaced Tchoyi in the 75^th minute.

Odemwingie was a good choice by Hodgson as a replacement, as Tchoyi looked increasingly tired and surrounded in the deeper areas behind Long. It did not make tactical sense however until Graeme Dorrans replaced Mulumbu on the 87^th minute, playing a very smart through-ball to Odemwingie who could have scored. This was a threat which Albion lacked for much of the match, having the defensive double pivot from their old 4-2-3-1, Scharner and Mulumbu, as their main players in the centre (Tchoyi drifted around the pitch). On his contribution Dorrans should have come on earlier. James Morrison should have been replaced too as the match wore on, with Anelka and Bosingwa’s threat growing – a prudent change would have been the introduction of Marek Cech, the attack-minded left-back who can also play in the midfield. This should have provided more defensive nous for Albion’s most troubled side.

Drogba did not perform much better than Torres, although his introduction did lift the crowd and formed the familiar of front three of Chelsea’s successful side under Ancelotti (i.e. Malouda, Drogba and Anelka).

Importantly as well, Hodgson refused to change his system, but Andre Villas Boas did not flinch at it. This is perhaps one of the largest reasons for while I feel that Albion flattered Chelsea in the second half, having bossed the first by imposing themselves on the game. Hopefully, however, the new system will work better against other teams and not fade as badly. If not, it’ll surely be a change of system.

Bibliography

http://www.whoscored.com/Matches/505453/Live/England-Premier-League-2011-2012-Chelsea-West-Bromwich

http://www.footytube.com/video/Chelsea-vs-West-Bromwich-Albion-88123?ref=lchan_results

http://www.guardianchalkboards.com/UserChalkboards.aspx?UserID=rjcroton

Food for thought for the Hawthorns Daimyō-- Image via Wikipedia

A few thoughts on the opening fixture

The only reason why this  is not a full match report is because I was not able to see the majority of the game – I saw the entire second half on television, and listened to from around 20 minutes onwards to the (poor) radio commentary. So I’ll only sketch out a few thoughts here.

Formation and performances: a matter of approach

For the opening game at least it was difficult to decide whether Roy Hodgson had chosen to keep the successful 4-2-3-1 system from last season, with Albion pushed back for long periods. This was not exactly anticipated, and it’s widely held that Hodgson will switch to a 4-4-2 or variant 4-4-1-1 formation in the near future. I reckon that the team lined up in a half-way house between 4-4-1-1 and 4-2-3-1, with the wide players being pressed defensively. Whatever, there were some minor tweaks:

- Paul Scharner was given much more license to attack from the double pivot. This brought forward the passing so that West Brom were not playing in the deeper areas. This was the secret as to why United were put under pressure. This allowed Scharner to make a number of long-range efforts, because his partner was being extremely disciplined in his role as the anchor man.

- The movement was generally fluid, helped by hardworking players like Somen Tchoyi (who continues his Albion ascendency following a first season of being confined mostly to the bench).

- James Morrison’s crossing was generally poor, despite his good pre-season record. The strength of United’s defence meant such an approach was quite naive – whilst passing through their defence was by no means the only approach available, it’s a statistically more reliable one than constantly crossing the ball as the only outlet. His opposite winger Chris Brunt did not play particularly well either, and Albion missed the pace of Jerome Thomas, who would have offered a similar threat to Somen Tchoyi.

- On his debut, Shane Long showed he is able to hold up the ball, and dropped back enough to justify his lone front-man role. His finish was better than the critics gave him credit for, and whilst De Gea should have saved it, on balance the pace and competence of the preceding play should be taken into account.

This all points to the wisdom of sticking with the current system. Rather than playing 4-4-2, which Hodgson is widely expected to convert to when forward Odemwingie returns from injury, Albion should deploy Odemwingie on the right hand side, where he can drive in and cut inside. This will also keep the double pivot which has helped Albion’s defence visibly improve over the past season or so, and has arguably contributed to the many come-backs which punctuated Albion’s campaign last season: the goal threat of Mulumbu and Scharner is borne out in their end of season tallies, which were impressive for defensive midfielders. This will also take advantage of the fact that midfield is arguably the strongest area of Albion’s set-up by some distance.

I wrote extensively at the closing of last season about the failings of 4-4-2 as a system, and I still feel that these reasons, along with the practicalities above, point to Hodgson having to perhaps reconsider his plans in the light of a very competent performance against the champions, which was worthy of a tie. An arguably shakey and unconvincing pre-season tour of the United States should be considered too (it’s being patronising and overly critical of the teams that West Brom played in North America, but it was a much sterner test than it should have been considering Albion’s resources and previous season).

Chelsea tomorrow.

Further reading:

English football is obsessed with 4-4-2 to its detriment (at Football Speak)

Champions League Final, Barcelona 3-1 Manchester United

 FA Cup Final: Stoke 0-1 Manchester City

http://kickaboutwiththegents.wordpress.com/according-to-the-programme/